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This paper focuses on the impact of financial fragmentation on small and medium enterprises (SMEs)’ 
access to finance. We combine country-level data on financial fragmentation and the ECB’s SAFE 
(Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises) data for 12 European Union (EU) countries over 
2009-2016. Our findings indicate that an increase in financial fragmentation not only raises the 
probability of all firms to be rationed but also to be charged higher loan rates; in addition, it increases 
the likelihood of borrower discouragement and it impairs firms’ perceptions of the future availability 
of bank funds. Less creditworthy firms are even more likely to become credit rationed, suggesting a 
flight to quality effect in lending. However, our study also documents a potential adverse effect of 
increasing bank market power resulting from greater integration. This suggests that financial 
integration could impair firms’ financing, if not accompanied by policy initiatives aimed at 
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“Integrated capital markets provide a wider source of financing and lower funding costs for 
households and firms and ultimately support innovation and the efficient allocation of capital.” 
Victor Costâncio, Vice-President of the ECB, 




In this study we explore the impact of financial fragmentation on small businesses’ access to 
finance. SMEs account for 99.8% of enterprises, 56.8% of the value added generated by the non-
financial sector and 66.6% of total employment in EU-28, and their most relevant financing sources 
are bank-based instruments.1 Therefore, divergences in loan interest rates across countries, coupled 
with difficulties in accessing bank products can ultimately hinder economic growth.  
In Europe, differences in average lending rates to non-financial companies tend to persist, and 
even increase significantly, and this was evident in the wake of the Eurozone debt crisis.  Dispersion 
across interest rates is a crude measure of fragmentation because it reflects structural differences in 
demand, such as firms’ creditworthiness, employment expectations and rates; as well as supply side 
factors, including banks’ default frequencies, capital and asset ratios and competition for banking 
products (ECB, 2013). Yet, in a fully financially integrated area, interest rates on loans do not depend 
on the country of residence of the firm but only on the factors related to the riskiness of the borrower 
(Zaghini, 2016).  
The increase in financial fragmentation has attracted considerable research interest on the effects 
on interest-rates pass-through (Mayordomo et al., 2015; Zaghini, 2016; Hovarth et al., 2018) and cross-
border bank retrenchment (Emter et al., 2018; Bremus and Neugebauer, 2018). These studies tend to 
agree on the possible negative effects of imperfect pass-through and retrenchment on firms’ access to 
                                               
1 EU-28 includes all European Union member states at the time of writing (2019). In this paper, we refer to an SME by the 
standard European Commission definition (http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/sme-
definition_en). Data are drawn from the European Commission (2017)’s Annual Report on European SMEs 2016/2017.  
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finance. However, to the best of our knowledge, these assertions have not been tested in the empirical 
literature.  
This paper attempts to fill this gap by addressing the following main research question: to what 
extent does financial fragmentation impair SMEs’ access to bank finance? We focus on the European 
case because after a long process of harmonisation and economic integration as part of the creation of 
a single market, the crisis inevitably brought about great instability and financial fragmentation and 
this latter has not yet been restored (Enria, 2018). In this study we conjecture that higher financial 
fragmentation affects the real economy because it increases frictions in the credit market. We look at 
both formal (quantity and price) and informal (discouragement) financing constraints and examine 
potential changes in bank behaviour and in firms’ expectations. Therefore, our sub-questions are 
further specifications of the main research question that this paper sets out to explore. This allows us 
on one hand to corroborate our conjecture; and on the other to provide a more detailed understanding 
of the underlying mechanisms at work. Specifically, we develop our research sub-questions as follows: 
does credit rationing occur through quantity or price rationing? What type of strategies do banks adopt 
to reallocate their lending portfolio after an increase in financial fragmentation? Specifically, is there 
a flight to quality in lending to riskier firms? Does financial fragmentation impair SMEs’ perceptions 
of future bank funds’ availability?.  
We contribute to the academic literature in several ways. First, we construct four measures of 
financial fragmentation of sovereign bond and credit markets with different maturities using a principal 
component technique. Our paper fills a gap in the literature as, to our knowledge, existing studies using 
a similar approach focus primarily on financial markets integration and create a global index without 
capturing country-specific trends (Volosovych, 2011; 2013; Donadelli and Paradiso, 2014; Billio et 
al., 2017). Second, we create a unique dataset by matching country-level measures of financial 
fragmentation with firm-level restricted data drawn from the ECB’s SAFE questionnaire. This data 
source offers three main advantages for our analysis as it allows to: (i) generate comprehensive 
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measures of both formal and informal credit constraints that are not available with credit register data2; 
(ii) include in the model a large set of fixed effects that accounts for common demand shocks that 
could significantly affect our results (see Section 4); and (iii) analyse a relatively long period (8 years) 
spanning from the first to the fifteenth wave of the SAFE questionnaire (2009 to 2016) with an 
extensive cross-country coverage of eleven euro area countries and the UK. 
We find that financial fragmentation has a significant impact on both quantity and price 
dimensions of credit constraints and on informal credit constraints –i.e. firms that are discouraged from 
applying because of fear of being rejected. The reduction in credit access shows evidence of a ‘flight 
to quality’ response, in which banks reduce lending to less creditworthy firms. Finally, we observe 
also that an increase in financial fragmentation reduces firms’ perceptions on the availability of future 
bank financing. These findings are robust to a battery of additional analyses including a Heckman 
selection model. 
Our evidence contributes to the general understanding of the functioning of the market for small 
business financing after an increase in financial fragmentation. This allows us to offer important policy 
insights in the context of the recent European regulatory post-crisis agenda that successfully dealt with 
banking sector fragilities but struggled to restore financial integration. There is no doubt that there are 
costs from financial fragmentation for SMEs as it reduces their ability to access bank-based financing. 
Further integration via a more harmonised regulatory and supervisory setting and a Capital Markets 
Union (CMU)3 is expected to reduce the SMEs’ dependency on the banking sector. This is because 
one of the key aims of CMU is to make it easier for small businesses to access financing through public 
markets and providing them with a wide choice of funding at a lower cost. However, there may be 
                                               
2 Credit register data contains only information on loan applications. However, applicant firms are a sub-sample of all 
firms: some firms do not apply because they do not need credit, while others do not apply because of fear of possible 
rejection. As suggested by Popov and Udell (2012), Ferrando et al. (2015; 2017) and Freel et al. (2012), among others, not 
accounting for these informal credit constraints could bias the results of the analysis.  
3 The capital markets union aims to: provide new sources of funding for businesses, especially for small and medium-sized 
enterprises; reduce the cost of raising capital; increase options for savers across the EU; facilitate cross-border investing 
and attract more foreign investment into the EU; support long-term projects; make the EU financial system more stable, 
resilient and competitive (European Council https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/capital-markets-union/). See 
also Zachariadis (2019). 
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some unintended drawbacks as well that could derive, for example, from excessive bank size and 
concentration. Financial integration might allow for cross-border bank mergers with a result of 
excessively increasing bank size. The empirical literature (Beck et al., 2004; Carbo et al., 2009; and 
Ryan et al., 2014) shows that bank market power leads to higher credit constraints for SMEs. This 
unintended effect might ultimately neutralize or even reverse the lower credit constraints that result 
from reducing financial fragmentation.  
 The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review and the main 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses different measures of financial fragmentation, the data and model 
specifications as well as the main results from the principal component analysis. Section 4 describes 
firm-level data and the econometric design adopted to analyse the impact of financial fragmentation 
on SMEs’ access to finance. Section 5 presents the empirical findings and the additional analyses. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Neoclassical theory asserts that financial integration has potential benefits in terms of growth 
resulting from a more efficient capital allocation from rich countries to emerging economies. Recent 
theoretical papers quantify the benefits of financial integration in the EU by demonstrating that lower 
integration impairs firms’ access to capital, which in turns generates lower economic output and lower 
risk-sharing (Fecht et al., 2012; Chakraborty et al., 2017). Other authors highlight the costs of an 
inefficient financial integration. In particular, for the EU context, Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Farhi 
and Tirole (2018) warn that financial integration without fiscal integration results in an inefficient 
equilibrium that generates ex-post contagion across countries and between sovereign and banks.  
The empirical literature on financial integration is mostly focused on stock markets and 
emphasises the potential benefits for listed firms in terms of reduction in their cost of equity (Bekaert 
et al., 2005; Mitton, 2006; among others). To our knowledge, for non-listed firms the literature is 
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scarce and focused mostly on the effect of foreign bank entry for SMEs’ access to finance and 
performance. Giannetti and Ongena (2009; 2012) and Beck et al. (2004) suggest that foreign bank 
entry increases availability of external financing for smaller firms through the removal of obstacles 
derived from banking sector concentration. Similar results are obtained in Popov and Ongena (2011), 
where increased interbank market integration resulted in less stringent borrowing constraints and lower 
loan rates for borrowers. Focusing on the cost of bank financing, Bremus and Neugebauer (2018) find 
that a decline in cross-border lending activities leads to an increase in funding costs for SMEs.  
Financial fragmentation of credit markets is transmitted from banks to borrowers through at least 
two channels. First, financial fragmentation can lead to a decline in credit flows across countries that 
ultimately reduces the availability of funds (Emter et al., 2018) and increases the cost of lending 
(Bremus and Neugebauer, 2018) for SMEs. Second, credit market fragmentation can reduce also 
domestic lending if the funding conditions of domestic banks deteriorate (De Haan et al., 2017) as 
cross-border interbank credit becomes scarce (Fecht et al., 2012).  
Changes in loan supply by individual banks would not matter much if SMEs could easily 
compensate by switching to alternative sources of credit, such as for example trade credit. However, 
as noted in Andrieu et al. (2018, among others) trade credit and bank financing are complementary 
rather than substitutes. The same difficulties in substituting bank-related products with market-based 
instruments and other sources of finance following credit supply shocks are also noted in Iyer et al. 
(2014) with Portuguese loan level data. As SMEs are mostly financed through banking products and 
represent most of the non-financial firms in the EU, their limited access to bank credit plays a crucial 
role for employment, investment, innovation and growth of the Euro area.  
According to the two transmission channels, supply shocks resulting from higher financial 
fragmentation might lead to different types of credit constraints for SMEs. The seminal work of Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) suggests imperfections in credit markets lead to credit rationing materialized in three 
different main categories: quantity, price rationing, and informal credit constraints. Specifically, 
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following loan applications: (1) quantity rationing might occurs in two forms: some firms receive a 
smaller part of the requested loan and some are credit denied in full; (2) price rationing occurs when 
firms are unable to get a loan due to the high costs4; finally (3) informal credit constraints appear when 
some firms do not apply because of fear of being rejected. The first two categories are supply-side 
measures of credit constraints, while the third is a demand-side measure. According to the theory (Kon 
and Storey, 2003) and the empirical evidence (Freel et al., 2012; Ferrando et al., 2015; 2017; Popov, 
2016; Han et al., 2009) it is important to separate firms that do not apply for credit because they do not 
need it from those that do not apply for credit because they are discouraged. Han et al. (2009) argue 
that in the case of uncreditworthy firm, discouragement is not problematic as it is part of the efficient 
functioning of the credit market. However, following Kon and Storey (2003)’s definition, discouraged 
borrowers are credit eligible firms that choose to not apply because of fear of rejection. Therefore, in 
general the level of discouragement increases the inefficiencies in the credit markets and leads to sub-
optimal levels of investment.  
The alternative to fragmentation is integration that, despite holding substantial benefits for the 
real economy, might also trigger unintended consequences. For example, integration can lead to cross-
border merger and acquisitions across banks with the result of an overall increase in relative bank size 
and a reduction of competition in banking markets. Theoretical literature on the relationship between 
banking sector concentration and firm financing, proposes two contrasting findings. The market power 
hypothesis predicts that increased banking concentration results in increased financing constraints for 
SMEs. Empirical findings by Carbo et al. (2009) and Ryan et al. (2014) strongly support this 
hypothesis on a sample of SMEs headquartered in European countries. In contrast to this view, 
Petersen and Rajan (1995)’s information hypothesis suggests that higher banking market concentration 
enables banks to forgo interest rate premiums that they charge to opaque and risky enterprises because 
                                               
4 According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) banks’ best strategy is to ration credit whenever demand increase interest rates 
above the optimal level.  
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of the information rents earned in subsequent periods. Conversely, banks operating in competitive 
markets break even by charging higher interest rates when borrowers’ returns exhibit higher 
uncertainty. In competitive environments, banks cannot capitalize the informational advantage 
contained in bank-firm relationships and so the incentive to build these relationships is negated. Market 
power is therefore predicted to result in better borrower-firm relationships that reduce information 
asymmetries and agency costs and ultimately improve borrowers’ access to finance. As far as we know 
there is no convincing empirical evidence that proofs this hypothesis.  
We conjecture that financial fragmentation triggers imperfect access to bank financing, i.e. it 
leads to credit supply shocks that are further transmitted to borrowers. Therefore, our first hypothesis, 
H1, can be formulated as follows: 
 
H1: Financial fragmentation leads to an increase in both formal and informal credit constraints.  
 
In our research setting, this first hypothesis is set out to help corroborate our main conjecture 
that higher financial fragmentation affects the real economy because it increases frictions in the credit 
markets.  
According to the financial accelerator theory, in presence of an adverse macroeconomic shock, 
banks reduce credit mostly to risky firms (Bernanke et al., 1996). The key underlying reason of this 
portfolio mechanism can be explained through information asymmetries and agency costs related to 
the credit markets. Imperfections in credit markets are reflected in the external finance premium. When 
a crisis breaks out, the premium increases due to the higher uncertainty in financial markets. In this 
context, smaller and riskier firms suffer most by the capital tightening (credit crunch, collateral or 
savings squeeze), because of the higher agency costs (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997) related to the 
financing of their investment projects. On the contrary, less risky borrowers have greater incentives to 
make well-informed investment choices and take actions to ensure good financial outcomes, reducing 
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the need for lenders of an intensive evaluation and monitoring of their projects. One version of this 
phenomenon, called “flight to quality in lending”, is similar to the “flight to home” effect and relates 
to the higher retrenchment of bank loans from foreign markets after a credit shock of different forms 
(De Haas and Van Horen, 2013; Popov and Van Horen, 2015). We empirically test the reallocation of 
credit after an increase in financial fragmentation in our second research hypothesis as follows: 
 
H2: Financial fragmentation leads to a reallocation of bank loan portfolios toward less risky-
borrowers – i.e. flight to quality in lending.  
 
Evidence against the flight to quality effect has been contemplated in a theoretical model by 
Freixas et al. (2003). The authors demonstrate that emergency liquidity assistance from central banks 
creates moral hazard incentives for financially distressed banks who then increase lending to risky 
borrowers to secure short-term profits. This lending portfolio reallocation strategy called “gambling 
for resurrection” might apply to banks in trouble due to weaknesses in the financial regulation 
framework.  
It is also possible for financial integration to trigger growth effects which improve firms’ 
confidence in the future business environment. The benefits from financial integration in terms of a 
country’s growth prospects are still debated in the literature. Some contributions on financial 
integration reveal a positive association (Schnabel and Seckinger, 2015; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009; 
Beck et al., 2004); while others point to a limited effect (Coeurdacier et al., 2019; Detragiache et al., 
2008). Understanding this relationship is important because if financial integration has a significant 
impact on future growth potential, then it may affect firms’ expectations of receiving external bank 
financing. In turn, if firms perceive that external financing will be limited, they might give up valuable 
investment opportunities.  
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We explicitly study the perceptions of external bank financing availability to check if financial 
fragmentation has an impact on future investment projects. We conjecture that for SMEs an increase 
in financial fragmentation will worsen their perception of availability of future bank financing, due to 
the increased cost and reduced availability of bank debt. Therefore, our third hypothesis can be 
formulated as follows: 
 
H3: An increase in financial fragmentation leads to a perception of lower availability of future 
external funds for SMEs. 
 
3. Financial fragmentation: measure, data and country-level results 
The first step in our methodological framework is to construct the country-level measures of 
financial fragmentation that we then use in the second stage of our analysis (section 4.3) to examine 
the impact of financial fragmentation on SMEs’ access to finance in Europe. Section 3.1 provides a 
description of the methodology and data sources used to measure fragmentation; in Section 3.2 we 
discuss the country- level results. 
 
3.1 Measuring fragmentation in credit and sovereign bond markets  
Financial integration indicators can be classified in three main categories: price-based 
indicators, volume-based indicators and regulatory measures (Billio et al., 2017). Among the three 
categories, price-based indicators are the most common due to their easier interpretation. Price-based 
indicators invoke the law of one price, according to which two or more markets are integrated when 
identical assets are priced equally across borders. For these reasons, several works have focused on 
the co-movement between prices across markets, using different methodological frameworks: Vector 
Auto Regression, Error Correction Models and cointegration (Jayasuriya, 2011; Gupta and Guidi, 
2012; Horvath et al., 2018); cross-country correlations (Goetzman et al., 2005; among others), 
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principal component analysis (Volosovych, 2011; 2013; Donadelli and Paradiso, 2014), factor analysis 
(Wagenvoort et al., 2011) and panel convergence methodologies (Rughoo and Sarantis, 2012).  
After the introduction of the single currency and the European Monetary Union over twenty 
years ago, the EU experienced substantial increases in market integration (Baele et al., 2004; Rughoo 
and Sarantis, 2012; Wagenvoort et al., 2011). This process brought considerable benefits to both 
lenders and borrowers and offering opportunities to diversify idiosyncratic risks away from domestic 
economies.  The global financial crisis in 2007-09 and the more recent euro-area sovereign debt crisis, 
exposed many weaknesses of integrated markets particularly in relation to the transmission of shocks 
and volatility (Zaghini, 2016; Mayordomo et al., 2015). In this study, we focus on financial 
fragmentation rather than integration not only because there is a potential trade-off with stability, but 
also because there is a need for research in this area that can help identify causes, consequences and 
effective policy actions. In a comprehensive review, Claessens (2019) notes that fragmentation5 might 
occur for many different reasons, including a range natural barriers and frictions as well as differences 
in financial regulation and supervision. 
We develop four measures of financial fragmentation using the principal component analysis 
(PCA). The choice is motivated by at least three reasons: (i) PCA is based on a clear theory-based 
interpretation (Volosovych, 2011; 2013, Donadelli and Paradiso, 2014; Billio et al., 2012; 2017); (ii) 
it accounts for several dimensions of integration including co-movement and segmentation; (iii) it is 
robust to outliers and avoids the selection of a benchmark country.6 In addition, as emphasised in Ellul 
                                               
5 There are many definitions of fragmentation in the literature, however the term is typically used to refer to some forms 
of imperfect financial markets integration based on the idea that in absence of fragmentation the “law of one price” should 
hold. Earlier studies that document that financial integration was achieved in the euro area (see for example: Baele et al., 
2004; Rughoo and Sarantis, 2012) used measures of integration, however recent studies document a fragmentation pattern 
after the eruption of the global and the sovereign debt crisis (Hovarth et al., 2018; Mayordomo et al., 2015; Zaghini, 2016) 
and started to implement new measures of fragmentation – i.e. for example dispersion across interest rates. 
6 Other studies use: (i) convergence of loans and deposit rates (Baele et al., 2004; Rughoo and Sarantis, 2012); (ii) the 
extent of cross-border activities, in terms of retail operations (Gual, 2004 and Perez et al.; 2005), deals and foreign loans 
(Schnabel and Seckinger, 2015; Emter et al., 2018). Both measures have drawbacks because interest rates could be different 
across countries due to differences in both banking products and characteristics of domestic borrowers. Equally, relying 
on cross-border activities ignores the fact that banks reduce lending operations less if, for example, the market is near; if 
they were present with a subsidiary; and/or if they acted in co-operation with a domestic lender (De Haas and Van Horen, 
2013; Popov and Van Horen, 2015). 
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and Yerramilli (2013), the most important advantage of employing PCA is that no categories have to 
be subjectively eliminated and no subjective judgements has to be made regarding the relative 
importance of each category. The limitation of the PCA technique is related to the fact that the choice 
of the number of countries included in the analysis may influence the results obtained (Billio et al., 
2017). For instance, in this study we extract the first component from twelve countries, whereas 
including all EU countries and countries outside the EU might lead to different results.  
According to Volosovych (2011) and Billio et al. (2012; 2017), commonality across asset 
returns can be detected by the proportion of total variation explained by the 1st principal component, 
dynamically extracted using a rolling window approach. PCA yields a decomposition of the variance-
covariance matrix of returns of a country set into the orthonormal matrix of eigenvectors 𝐿. The first 
subset of eigenvalues captures a larger portion of the total volatility when the majority of returns tend 
to move together. Therefore, periods when the first principal component explains more of the total 
variation are indicative of increased integration across countries.  
We employ the PCA on a six-month rolling window for the monthly time series of interest 
rates for twelve selected EU countries. To allow the interpretation of commonalities between returns, 
we create a measure of dispersion across the first matrix of eigenvectors 𝐿 as the ratio of the absolute 
value of the difference between the eigenvectors of a country and the mean of the eigenvectors over 





    (1) 
 
where 𝐿1,3 is the eigenvector of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡,  𝐸(𝐿3) is the mean of the eigenvectors of the 
selected countries at time 𝑡. At this point the interpretation is quite intuitive: the higher the value of 
the ratio, the higher the financial fragmentation in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡.  
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Our PCA technique is applied on monthly interest rates for eleven Euro area countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and 
the UK. The ECB reports interest rates of Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) in the EU, both for 
new business and for outstanding amounts. We gather data on the 10-year bond rates of sovereign 
countries and loan interest rates on euro area non-financial corporations with the following maturities: 
up to 1 year (hereafter STL = Short Term Loans), over 1 year and up to 5 years (hereafter MTL = 
Medium Term Loans) and over 5 years (hereafter LTL = Long Term Loans).7 It should be noted that 
short-term loans include long-term variable rate loans but exclude overdrafts.8  
Table A.1 in appendix A illustrates the basic descriptive statistics of the interest rates series by 
country between January 2009 and December 2016. For short-term loans, there is a clear evidence of 
short and long-run convergence until 2011 as differences across interest rates are lower in these 
periods. This partly reflects the similar economic conditions and inflation expectations among the 
selected countries. After 2011, we observe a deviation of short-term interest rates for sovereign 
stressed countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). For sovereign bond markets, the process 
of fragmentation is less evident and occurs only during the peak of the sovereign debt crisis, then the 
convergence of interest rates appears to rebound.  
Moving to longer maturities, we document a similar pattern of convergence before the EU 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010-2012. After that period, the process of fragmentation is less pronounced 
in comparison to that observed for short-term maturities. Short-term loan rates are generally higher for 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, while medium and long-term loan rates are usually higher in UK, 
Portugal and Greece. Part of these cross-country differences can be explained by macroeconomic 
conditions, inflation and the structure of the banking sector.  
                                               
7 Unfortunately, data on new business loans is missing for some countries (for example Belgium and UK).   
8 We do not distinguish between interest rates on small /large volumes (below/above EUR 1 million) of loans because the 
data is missing for Belgian, Greek and Portuguese rates both at the ECB and national central banks.  
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By comparing the evolution of sovereign bond yields and interest rates on loans, we can 
observe that unconventional monetary policy actions are not passed immediately to lending rates. This 
is in line with the results shown by Ritz and Walther (2105)9, De Haan et al. (2017) and BIS (2011) 
on the effect of wholesale funding shocks due to the sovereign crisis on lending rates and volumes.  
 
3.2 Results of principal component analysis  
 An increase in financial integration should be associated with commonality in asset returns 
across countries. In this paper we attempt to measure commonality through PCA technique as 
described in Section 3.1. We apply the PCA technique on sovereign and credit markets interest rates 
on a semi-annual time window, over the whole sample period considered (2009-2016). The results of 
our financial fragmentation measure, derived from the application of equation (1) on eigenvalues, are 
presented in Table 1, that provides country-level summary statistics of our financial fragmentation 
measures. Table A.2 in appendix A reports the information on the proportion of variance explained by 
the first principal component.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Our measures of financial fragmentation show considerable variation over the period under 
analysis. During the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, we observe a peak in the trend of financial 
fragmentation for both sovereign and credit markets. Following 2011, the sovereign market 
experienced a rebound in financial integration, while credit markets’ fragmentation increased during 
2012 and 2013. Overall, we document that the short-term loan market is much more fragmented than 
                                               
9 Ritz and Walther (2015) do not analyse empirically the effect of the wholesale funding shocks after the sovereign debt 
crisis. They develop a theoretical model to explain the effect of wholesale uncertainty on lending.    
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other markets with longer maturities. The results are consistent with those observed in ECB (2013) 
and Horvath et al. (2018) who find a lower pass-through of loan interest rates with longer maturities.  
Table A.2 in the appendix displays the percentage of variance explained by the first principal 
component, that is higher for the sovereign market as compared to the credit market. This corroborates 
our findings reported in Table 1. Moreover, the percentage of variance explained is lower for shorter-
term loans, thereby further confirming our contention on the behaviour of short-term markets described 
above. Finally, since the eigenvalues of the second and the third component are lower, we can confirm 
that the first component captures most of the variation and can be proxied as a measure of financial 
fragmentation10. This is in line with other previous studies that used a similar approach (Billio et al., 
2017; Volosovich, 2011) using stock market returns.  
For our main analysis we use the measure of fragmentation on sovereign markets since it is 
more reactive in comparison to loan interest rates measures that exhibit a different pass-through of 
monetary policy and other market events. We use financial fragmentation measures of loan interest 
rates of different maturities in the additional analysis (Section 5.4) to provide further evidence of 
consistency of our results. 
 
4. Firm level data, dependent variables and empirical methodology  
To investigate our three hypotheses, we combine micro-level data from the SAFE Survey with 
our country-level measures of financial fragmentation. In this section, first we briefly explain the 
purpose of the SAFE Survey, then we describe the key dependent variables that capture access to bank 




                                               
10 These results are not reported for the sake of brevity, but they are available with the authors upon request.  
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4.1 Firm-level data: Presentation of the SAFE survey 
Firm-level data comes from the “Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises” (SAFE). The 
SAFE questionnaire started in 2009 and is run jointly by the ECB and the European Commission every 
six months. Firms in the survey are randomly selected from the Dun & Bradstreet business register 
and are stratified by country, enterprise size class and economic activity. The sample size is different 
across countries in order to be sufficiently representative for the bigger economies. Firms from 
Germany, Spain, France and Italy account for roughly 15-20% of the total firms in the sample.11 
As regard the stratifications by firm size classes, the sample includes micro (1-9 employees), 
small (10-49 employees) and medium-sized (50-249 employees) enterprises. The firms are split into 
four major economic activities based on the one-digit level of NACE classification12. Economic 
activities include the four largest industries: manufacturing, construction, trade and services.13 In terms 
of sectoral breakdown: 10% of firms are in the construction, 25% are in the service sector (business 
service, transport and real estate), 30% in manufacturing while the remaining 35% are in retail and 
trade. The same firms were re-surveyed across countries where possible. However, only a limited 
portion of firms were re-surveyed limiting the possibility of constructing a large panel data sample of 
enterprises.  
We use 15 waves for the 11 most representative euro area countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, plus the UK, for a total of 
106,576 observations. We focus on these countries because coverage for smaller euro area countries 
is more limited. Section 4.2 explains the key dependent variables and Section 4.3 provides the details 
                                               
11 In addition, the questionnaire provides weights to restore the proportions of the economic weight (in terms of number of 
employees) of each size class, economic activity and country. All regressions use these weights.  
See: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pdf/surveys/sme/methodological_information_survey_and_user_guide.pdf - for 
methodological information about the SAFE survey. 
12 The abbreviation NACE is the classification of economic activities in the European Union (EU); the term NACE is 
derived from the French Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne. 
13 Firms in agriculture, public administration and financial services are excluded from the Questionnaire.  
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of the empirical methodology and firm-level explanatory variables. All variable definitions and 
sources can be found in Table B.1 in the appendix.  
 
4.2 Key dependent variables 
Our main target is to evaluate how financial fragmentation affects SMEs’ access to finance and 
the underlying mechanisms at work (H1 and H2). To do so, we construct two key dependent variables 
using the responses to two specific survey questions which ask firms about their bank loan 
applications, as well as the outcome of these applications in the prior six months.  
In particular, the first question is aimed at detecting whether a firm applied for a bank loan, as 
well as the reasons why it did not: “With regards to bank loans, could you please indicate whether 
you: (1) applied for them over the past 6 months [Applied]; (2) did not apply because you though you 
would be rejected [Discouraged]; (3) did not apply because you had sufficient internal funds 
[Sufficient internal funds]; (4) or did not apply for other reasons [Did not apply for other reasons]”. 
With this question, we model a dependent variable labelled bank loan application, that takes value 1 
if a firm applied for credit, a value of 2 if a firm is discouraged to apply, a value of 3 if a firm did not 
apply because of sufficient internal funds and 4 if did not apply for other reasons. 
The second question, is addressed only to firms who have applied for a bank loan and is 
intended to get information about the result of the application process: “If you applied for a bank loan 
over the past 6 months, did you: (1) receive almost all the financing you requested [Applied and got 
almost everything]; (2) receive only part of the financing you requested [Loan scaled]; (3) refuse to 
proceed because of unacceptable costs of terms and conditions [Refused]; (4) or have you not received 
anything at all” [Denied]. With this second question, we construct the second dependent variable 
named bank loan result that takes value 1 if a firm applied and got almost everything, 2 if a firm is 
loan scaled, 3 if a firm refused the loan offer due to high costs and a value of 4 if a firm is credit denied.  
Figure A.1 in appendix A offers a simple visual representation of the key dependent variables. 
18 
Table 2 presents the observations’ frequency and shows that over 65% of the survey 
respondents do not apply for a bank loan either because of sufficient internal funds (43.97%) or 
because of other (undisclosed) reasons (21.74%), while roughly 6.5% of the survey respondents 
(corresponding to 6,810 observations) declare to be discouraged borrowers. Discouraged firms 
represent a subsample of non-applicant firms that desire bank credit for financing their activities but 
do not apply because of fear of possible rejection. In terms of number of observations, there are more 
discouraged borrowers in this sample than firms that applied for credit and got their application denied 
(2,690 observations) or scaled (2,217 observations). These preliminary statistics highlight the 
importance of considering discouraged borrowers in the study as these are not necessary less 
creditworthy than applicant firms. The higher level of discouragement represents foregone investment 
opportunities for firms and missed lending opportunities on the part of banks. Interestingly, only a 
limited portion of applicant firms refused the loan offer due to high costs (561 observations), this 
accounts for roughly 2.10% of the respondents that applied for bank financing.  
To test our third hypothesis (H3), we take advantage of a specific question that asks firms if 
they perceive that bank financing will improve, deteriorate or remain unchanged over the next six 
months. With this information we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if firms perceive that bank 
financing will increase in the next six months (Perception of future funds). Table 3 reports the summary 
statistics and reveals that 20.26% of surveyed firms perceive that bank financing will increase in the 
next six months. By examining the evolution of this variable across the waves of the questionnaire 
(not reported) it is evident that the perception of availability of future funds increases during credit 
expansion periods. 
 




4.3 Empirical methodology and firm-level explanatory variables 
As discussed above, we examine three related hypotheses. The first is whether financial 
fragmentation affects both formal and informal credit constraints (H1). The second is whether risky 
firms are more sensitive to the increase in financial fragmentation due to the higher information 
asymmetries faced in their lending-borrower relationships (H2). Third, we investigate the expectations 
of firms about future bank financing after an increase in financial fragmentation (H3). Since survey 
questions on loan application demand and loan application results take more than two outcomes, we 
investigate H1 using a multinomial logit model of the following form:  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏@𝑦1,A,B,3C = 𝛽E𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛B,39E 	+ 𝛽H𝑋1,A,B,3 + 𝛽J𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜B,39E + 𝜗B,3 + 𝛾A,3 + 𝜃B,A
+ 𝜀1,A,B,3					(2) 
 
Where: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏@𝑦1,A,B,3C are both bank loan – application and bank loan – results; 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛B,39E	 are country-level measures of financial fragmentation (see Section 
3); 𝑋1,A,B,3 is a set of firm-level covariates to control for firm-level heterogeneity, 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜B,39E is a vector 
of macroeconomic controls. In addition, we add a bi-dimensional set of fixed effects that allow us to 
net out common demand side effects.14 Specifically, we include: country-time fixed effects (𝜗B,3) to 
control for shocks that are common to all firms in a country in a specific wave of the questionnaire, 
such as for example the sovereign debt crisis;  industry-time fixed effects (𝛾1,3)	to net out unobserved 
shocks on demand factors common to all firms in a specific industry at a specific wave; country-
industry fixed effects (𝜃B,1) to remove shocks common to all firms in the same sector in the same 
country, for example shocks related to demand of housing in Spain.   
                                               
14 Simple fixed effects – i.e. country, time and industry – do not allow us to carefully separate common demand side shocks. 
For that reason, we use the interaction between fixed effects – i.e. country-time, industry-time and country-industry fixed 
effects. 
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The main coefficient of interest, 𝛽E, captures the changes in access to finance given the level 
of financial fragmentation. A positive sign implies that all else equal, access to finance deteriorated 
more for firms in countries with higher financial fragmentation of sovereign bond or credit markets.  
Based on the literature, we control for firm characteristics (𝑋1,A,B,3) using information on: firm 
size, age, ownership structure, self-assessment of capital strength, outlook and credit history. In the 
following lines we justify our selection of control variables more closely. First, firm size and age are 
important for banks’ financing. Larger firms are seen as less risky by lenders, because of their lower 
opaqueness and/or because of greater availability of collateral (Berger and Udell, 1998; 2006). 
Investing in smaller firms, in most cases, introduces higher transaction costs associated with banks’ 
screening. This often results in higher loan rates and credit rationing for smaller firms (Cowling et al., 
2012; Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2010). Older firms tend to have established banking 
relationships, and this facilitates their access to external financing in comparison with new established 
firms (Berger and Udell, 1995; Cowling et al., 2012; Ferrando et al., 2017; among others). We model 
firms’ Size as a categorical variable equal to one for micro firms (1-9 employees), two for small (10-
49 employees) and three for medium sized (50-249 employees), while Age is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if a firm has been in business for less than two years. Table 3 shows that the average firm size is 
relatively small (2.07) and has been in existence for more than five years. 
Bank credit rating scoring models are based on historical and behavioural information on firm’s 
ability to repay a loan. In these models, leverage, performance and credit history are important inputs 
for assessing firms’ credit risk. In particular, the probability of repaying debt is higher for firms that 
improve their profitability and reduced their leverage. However, this is also the case for firms with 
superior historical performance that build up their capital reserve within their businesses and which 
are likely to reduce their probability of default (Cowling, 2010). Moreover, credit history is an element 
of soft information that banks use in their risk assessment and an improvement in bank-firm 
relationship increases the probability of firms to repay their debts. To capture information on 
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profitability, capital and credit history we take advantage of the questions which ask firms if their 
profitability (Positive outlook), capital (Capital improvements) and credit quality (Better credit 
history) improved in the past 6 months. Table 3 shows that 23% of the respondents declare an 
improvement in their credit history, 25% in their sales and profitability, and 26% declare an 
improvement in capital.   
We also consider owners’ characteristics that capture important aspects of the firm owners’ 
human capital and the creditworthiness of the enterprise. Family-owned business have better access to 
credit because they face less moral hazard problems and undertake more conservative investment 
strategies (Bopaiah, 1998; Psillaki et al., 2015). Moreover, family firms usually have more durable 
banking relationships in comparison to non-family firms and this attenuates the effects of a credit 
shocks to this type of firms. On the contrary, Ferrando and Griesshaber (2011) suggests that family 
firms are more credit constrained because ownership structure is connected to firm size as smaller 
firms are more likely to be owned by a family or single person in comparison to larger firms. 
Information on the variable Family owner is captured by a dummy variable that takes value one for 
firms that are family owned, which represent 50.49% of the respondents of the survey. 
The second owner characteristic controls for the fact that firms can be part of a group or stand-
alone firms. The rationale is that firms that are part of groups are less financially constrained in 
comparison to stand-alone firms due to access to internal group funds (Bremus and Neugebauer, 2018). 
This information is captured through a dummy variable that takes value one if a firm is an autonomous 
profit-oriented firm (Stand Alone).  
In terms of macroeconomic control variables (𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜B,39E), we include information on gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth, unemployment and the structure of the banking sector. We expect a 
lower probability of credit constraints in countries with higher GDP growth and lower unemployment 
rates as macroeconomic expansion increases loan demand and improves firms’ credit risk conditions. 
To account for the heterogeneity of the EU banking sector we include the concentration ratios 
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calculated on the top 5 financial institutions in a specific country. In line with the recent findings of 
Carbo et al. (2009) and Ryan et al. (2014) we expect that increased banking concentration results in 
increased financing constraints for SMEs.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here]  
 
To test hypothesis 2 (H2), we extend Equation (2) by interacting firm-specific proxies of credit 
risk with our preferred measure of financial fragmentation. More specifically, we modify equation (2) 
as follows:  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏@𝑦1,A,B,3C = 𝛽E𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛B,39E ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡	𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘1,A,B,3 	+ 𝛽H𝑋1,A,B,3 + 𝛽J𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜B,39E
+ 𝜗B,3 + 𝛾A,3 + 𝜃B,A + 𝜀1,A,B,3					(3) 
 
where: 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡	𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘1,A,B,3 is proxied by five firm-specific variables that we present so far: positive 
outlook, capital improvements and better credit history, size and age. As discussed before, firms’ 
leverage, performance, credit history, size and age are important inputs for assessing firms’ credit risk. 
All control variables remain the same as in equation (2). In this regression the coefficients of the 
interaction terms capture the increasing effect of financial fragmentation on risky firms.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3) is tested using a probit model in which the dependent variable measures 
firms’ perceptions about the availability of future bank financing – as explained in the previous 
subsection – and the set of independent variables used in equation (2).  
Finally, our empirical investigations are not free from limitations. The first one is related to the 
fact that surveys contain subjective responses to interviewers’ questions. This is particularly important 
in our dataset for those concerning the self-assessment of the risk variables related to capital, credit 
history and outlook improvement as they may not be supported by balance sheet information. Another 
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limitation concerns the use of cross-sectional data instead of panel data. With cross-sectional data the 
exact timing of the responses is unknown, so we cannot incorporate additional firm-level information 
regarding bank-firm relationships. For example, we do not know if firms that improve their capital 
were or not credit constrained in the past.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Financial fragmentation and firms’ access to finance 
In this section we present the empirical results of our estimations of the effects of financial 
fragmentation of sovereign bond markets on bank loan application and its related outcome (H1). In 
Table 4, we start with the demand side, where we analyse the effects of financial fragmentation on 
discouraged borrowers. In this table, we report the empirical results of the multinomial logit model 
with bank loan application as the dependent variable. To estimate a multinomial logit model, one 
needs to select a base or reference category to which the coefficient estimates relate. While 
theoretically it does not matter which of the alternative outcomes of bank loan application demand we 
use, we select the category of firms that did not apply for credit for other reasons. In the additional 
analysis section, we show that our results are robust even when we change the base category.  
Panel A of Table 4 presents the estimates. We find that financial fragmentation decreases the 
probability of applying for credit (column 1) and increases the probability of being discouraged from 
applying (column 2). This means that financial fragmentation has a significant impact on informal 
credit constraints. The marginal effects evaluated at the mean (Panel B of Table 4) are highly 
significant and indicate that the economic magnitude of financial fragmentation is significant. For a 
1% increase in financial fragmentation, we find a 1.5% increase in the likelihood of observing 
discouraged borrowers.  
The scale of discouraged firms in an economy depends on three main factors: screening errors 
of banks, application costs and the spread between interest rates charged on firms and those charged 
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by money lenders on banks (Kon and Storey, 2003). Although not directly tested, it is plausible that 
the uncertainty related to a higher level of financial fragmentation affects screening errors because of 
higher information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. In this context, banks might face 
difficulties in evaluating high quality SMEs’ projects. Moreover, it also possible that financial 
fragmentation refrained some borrowers from applying for credit due to the increased cost of bank 
financing.15  
Further, we observe a few interesting results in the control variables. It is not unusual that firms 
that are discouraged from applying (column 2 of table 4) declare negative self-assessment of their 
capital and credit history. These two variables have a prominent role in banks’ credit scoring systems, 
therefore due to the deterioration of these two characteristics, firms do not apply for a loan because of 
fear of being credit rejected. Moreover, in line with Freel et al. (2012) and Han et al. (2009), we observe 
that discouraged borrowers tend to be newly born firms with less experience in the credit market. In 
other words, the level of discouragement increases for firms with less established banking relationship 
and with more opaque projects in time of higher financial fragmentation. This could possibly be related 
to a large extent of screening errors made by banks, given the higher uncertainty related to financial 
fragmentation, or because some borrowers may have indeed refrained from asking for credit in order 
to avoid generating negative credit history.  
Banking market concentration seems very relevant in explaining discouraged borrowers where 
we find a relatively large, positive and statistically significant coefficient. This is consistent with 
findings linking concentration in banking markets with firms’ credit constraints (Carbo et al., 2009; 
Ryan et al., 2014). Han et al. (2009) pointed out that self-rationing mechanism is more efficient in 
concentrated banking markets because banks have higher incentives in investing in relationship 
lending with the consequence that risky borrowers are more likely to be discouraged. Therefore, based 
                                               
15 This assertion is partially proven with the result in column 3 of table 5, where we observe that financial fragmentation 
increases the number of firms that refused a loan due to the higher interest rates. 
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on their findings, discouragement can benefit banks to avoid the problem of screening errors in loan 
applications. However, since we do not know the portion of discouraged creditworthy firms and the 
length of the relationships between banks and borrowers, we cannot speculate more about the effects 
of this coefficient.     
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
In Table 5, we present the empirical results on the effects of financial fragmentation of sovereign 
bond markets on the outcomes of the applications for bank loans. For all of the outcome variables, the 
estimated coefficients of financial fragmentation are always positive and significant. The marginal 
effects evaluated at the mean (Panel B of Table 5) reveal that an increase in financial fragmentation 
increases the probability of: being loan scaled by 2.5%, refusing a loan due to high costs by 2.1% and 
roughly 0.6% of being credit denied. The positive sign and significance of the main coefficients of 
interest could also be related to an amplification effect not driven by firm demand-side factors 
experienced during and after the sovereign debt crisis. Altavilla et al. (2017) and Popov and Van Horen 
(2015) observe that banks with large sovereign exposures reduced lending of their foreign subsidiaries, 
even though their subsidiaries are based in core EU countries.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Moving to the specific coefficients of interest, in Table 5 we observe that financial fragmentation 
has a similar effect on credit scaling (column 1 of Table 5) and on the amount of loans refused due to 
high costs (column 2 of Table 5). This suggests that a shock on banks’ balance sheets following an 
increase in financial fragmentation is passed on firms through both quantity and price adjustments, as 
increased financial fragmentation triggers more severe information asymmetry problems. This may 
also occur because banks encounter difficulties in monitoring firms’ behaviour once the loan is 
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granted. However, even though statistically significant, the coefficient of financial fragmentation has 
a smaller effect on credit denial (column 3 of Table 5) suggesting that banks do not tighten too much 
their credit standards after an increase in financial fragmentation of sovereign bond markets. In other 
words, this lower coefficient suggests that banks do not modify their screening mechanisms after an 
increase in financial fragmentation.  
With regard to the firm-specific control variables, estimates suggest that firms reporting 
improvements in terms of capital and credit history are less likely to be loan scaled or denied. 
Moreover, new firms tend to be loan scaled and loan denied. This latter result can be related to their 
greater opaqueness or because they typically have less availability of collateral than older firms 
(Berger and Udell, 1998; 2006). Also, firms that refuse a loan (column 2 of Table 5) due to the high 
costs appear to be typically smaller in size and report an improvement in their credit history. 
Interestingly, in line with the empirical findings of Carbo et al. (2009) and Ryan et al., (2014) 
the probability of facing (some type of) reduced credit access increases in countries with more 
concentrated banking sectors. Finally, macroeconomic control variables, when significant, have the 
expected signs in all models and overall results suggest that a deteriorating macroeconomic 
environment increases the probability for firms to be credit denied. 
The important takeaway in this context is that an increase in financial fragmentation is passed 
on through price adjustments (loan refused) and non-price dimensions (credit rationing) of lending. 
Moreover, the effect is visible and relevant also for firms that are discouraged from applying, which 
represent a relatively important share of firms in our sample. In comparison to more severe shocks to 
the banking sector, such as the sovereign debt crisis, financial fragmentation has a smaller impact on 
loan application denial. As pointed out in Ferrando et al. (2017), the sovereign debt crisis increased 
loan application denial and loan scale without having a larger effect on price dimensions and on firms 




5.2 Is there a “Flight to quality” in lending?  
In this section we exploit firms’ heterogeneity in order to analyse which type of firms suffer 
most from an increase in financial fragmentation. As discussed in Section 2, after a negative shock 
banks might adjust their lending portfolios away from risky borrowers – i.e. flight to quality in lending. 
Results of the estimations of equation (3) that explicitly tests our second hypothesis, H2, are reported 
in Table 6.    
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
 We observe different coefficients depending on the outcome. It appears that firms that report 
an improvement in capital and credit history are less likely to be loan scaled (column 1 of Table 6) or 
credit denied (column 3 of Table 6). This result is in line with our expectations and suggests that banks 
reduced credit to less creditworthy firms when financial fragmentation increases. Moreover, it appears 
that new firms are more likely to be credit denied. This suggest that banks prefer to deny credit to firms 
with less established lending relationship when financial fragmentation increases. In column 2 of Table 
6, we look at firms that refused the loan due to high costs and notice that those firms are new and 
smaller in size. This result suggests that banks tend to increase loans’ interest rates (price rationing) to 
firms with less established lending relationships and with a smaller size.  
Overall, results in Table 6 imply that information asymmetries problems become more severe 
in some lender-borrower relationships due to an increased borrower opacity, leading to price (refused) 
and non-price adjustments (rationing). According to these findings we can argue that banks become 
more cautious when making lending decisions after an increase in financial fragmentation. Hence, we 
can document a “flight to quality” effect in lending after an increase in financial fragmentation with 
banks adjusting their portfolios away from more opaque and risky borrowers. This finding corroborates 
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theoretical arguments that after a supply shock of different forms, it is likely to observe a reallocation 
of credit from low-net worth to high-net worth borrowers.  
 
5.3 Perception of availability of future external funds 
In this section we evaluate the impact of financial fragmentation on firms’ expectations about 
future availability of bank financing (H3). To do so, we run equation (2) using the perceived 
availability of future bank funds as a dependent variable. Results of the estimation are reported in 
Table 7. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
  
We find that financial fragmentation of bond markets has a negative effect on firms’ 
perceptions of future external debt financing. Our evidence suggests that firms’ expectations of the 
availability of future bank funds diminished significantly in times of financial fragmentation. This 
result indicates that financial fragmentation might possibly reduce the amount of valuable investment 
opportunities that firms can set up in the next period.   
Regarding firm-specific covariates, we find that firms that improve their risk indicators in terms 
of capital, credit history and outlook perceive an increase in the availability of future bank financing 
funds. The result is in line with Ferrando and Mulier (2015) that find that less creditworthy firms tend 
to be more concerned about future availability of bank financing. 
 
5.4 Additional analyses  
In this section, we address four non-trivial concerns about our empirical results. Since we 
consider a long-time period that comprises also the sovereign debt crisis, one might be concerned that 
our results may be impacted significantly. To rule out this concern, we run our estimates without 
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considering the sovereign crisis period when financial fragmentation of both credit and sovereign 
markets was consistently higher. We run equation (2) using the data gathered by the SAFE survey after 
the crisis period from wave 8 (February and March 2013) to wave 16 (September and October 2016). 
If the coefficients of financial fragmentation measures are similar to those estimated above, we can 
conclude that our results are not driven by the crisis periods.  
Panel A of Table 8 reports the estimates of the main coefficients of the multinomial probit 
model which confirm that financial fragmentation has an effect also in the rebounding period after the 
crisis that allow us to confirm the validity of the results in Tables 4 and 5 in which we claim that 
financial fragmentation is important for firms’ access to finance. Interestingly, the higher magnitude 
and significance of the main coefficient of interest suggest that financial fragmentation is important 
for SMEs’ access to finance even during periods of economic expansion.  
We also remove the peripheral countries affected by the sovereign debt crisis: Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS). This test also allows us to verify whether countries with similar 
characteristics suffered more than others from financial fragmentation. In contrast to core countries 
that benefited from higher integration levels over the period especially during the crisis, GIIPS 
experienced higher levels of financial fragmentation. Results in Panel B of Table 8 further confirm our 
assertions on the impact of financial fragmentation on SMEs’ access to finance. The coefficient 
estimates of interest remain positive and significant in all specifications and confirm that fragmentation 
impairs firms’ access to finance also in these countries.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
In this study we use a measure of fragmentation that reflects conditions of the sovereign bond 
market. This is because the underlying mechanism is easier to interpret – i.e. an increase in the 
repricing in the sovereign bond markets is transmitted on funding costs of banks – while the pass-
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through on loan rates of banking markets depends on a series of factors: purpose of the loan, structure 
of the banking market products. We also repeat the estimations with our measures of financial 
fragmentation on banking markets of different maturities: short (STL), medium (MTL) and long term 
(LTL)16.  
Results are displayed in Table 9 and further confirms our main results. As we discussed in 
Section 3 fragmentation in credit markets is higher than fragmentation on sovereign bond markets. 
Moreover, the pass-through of financial fragmentation in loan market segments with longer maturities 
takes longer time as banks gradually transmit funding shocks into lending interest rates. Despite this 
different pass-through, financial fragmentation of banking markets has a positive and significant effect 
on SMEs’ access to finance. The magnitude of the coefficients remains roughly the same, suggesting 
that the estimated economic impact of fragmentation on banking markets on SMEs’ financing 
constraints is similar to that observed when considering fragmentation on sovereign bond markets. 
 
 [Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
We address also two potential concerns related to sample selection and firm loan demand. Our 
main model fails to account for the fact that firms that apply for credit are not a random sample of the 
population of firms. In order to take this potential bias in consideration, we use a simple probit model 
with Heckman selection procedure, i.e. a two-step probit estimator that controls for sample selection. 
In the selection equation, we incorporate information on firms that do not apply for credit because of 
sufficient internal funds or for other reasons17 as well as two additional control variables that account 
for firms’ demand for credit. The exclusion restriction requires that the selection equation should be 
estimated on a set of variables that is larger by at least one variable than the set of variables in the 
                                               
16 In a not displayed test (for reasons of brevity), we also control our results using alternative measures of financial 
fragmentation. 
17 Firms that do not apply because of fear of rejection are included in the output equation of the Heckman correction 
procedure. 
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outcome equation (Popov and Udell, 2012; Ongena et al., 2013; Heckman, 1979). Credible 
identification rests on including at least one variable that has a non-zero effect on the selection variable 
(firms that do not apply because of sufficient internal funds or for other reasons) and a zero effect on 
the outcomes (denied, refused, scaled and discouraged).   
The first additional control variable in our selection equation equals one if a firm report that its 
main problem is product competition and zero otherwise. The underlying idea is that stronger or 
increasing competitive pressure can reduce firm’s expectation about its future growth (Popov and 
Udell, 2012). The second variable excluded in the outcome equation takes value one if a firm declare 
that is most pressing problem is costs of production, and zero otherwise. If product costs increase, it 
becomes difficult for a firm targeting the desired level of profitability and expand their activities. Based 
on the theoretical model of demand for credit lines of Martin and Santomero (1997) and the empirical 
evidence in Bremus and Neugebauer (2018), firms with lower growth perspective have lower credit 
demand. For computational reasons and because of difficulties in the estimation, we run the Heckman 
model with country, time and industry fixed effects, without taking in consideration the interactions 
between fixed effects that are more likely to absorb common demand shocks. Results are reported in 
panel A of Table 10.  
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
The results of the estimations with the Heckman model further confirm our main results shown 
in Tables 4 and 5. The main variable of interest (financial fragmentation) remains positive and 
significant with a similar coefficient. The fact that the results are fairly similar (although slightly 
weaker for some firm control variables; not displayed for reasons of brevity) indicates that selection 
bias is not a main concern in our main estimations.  
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Then we control for firm demand side effects. Our results suggest that an increase in financial 
fragmentation has a statistically significant impact on SMEs’ access to finance. Specifically, it might 
be a demand-driven transmission mechanism that works through firms’ balance sheets independent 
from financial fragmentation paths. If loan demand for firm 𝑖 increases and this is not controlled for, 
the probability of being credit constrained increases as well, thus our estimates are biased upward. By 
contrast, if loan demand declines our estimates are biased downward. We address this point formally 
with two different solutions. In the first check, we run equation (2) on a subset of firms that declare in 
the survey wave that their most pressing problem was selling their products. While in the second check, 
we run the same equation on a subset of firms that declare an increase in product competition and 
difficulties in selling their products. Results of these additional tests are reported in Panel B and C of 
Table 10 and further confirm our main estimates, as the coefficients of the main variables of interest 
remain broadly the same. This removes our concern on an upward or downward bias of the main 
coefficient capturing the effect of financial fragmentation on firms’ access to bank financing.  
The last concern relates to the categories identified in the survey. In the bank loan application, 
the survey offers firms four options: (1) applying for credit; (2) did not apply because of fear of 
possible rejection; (3) did not apply because of sufficient internal funds and (4) did not apply for other 
reasons. Firm observations in category 3 and 4 can be grouped since both categories contain 
observations related to firms that do not desire bank funding. Results of the estimates are shown in 
panel A of Table 11 and remain qualitatively similar than those shown in Table 4.  
 Moreover, firms that refused the loan due to high costs might be high quality borrowers that 
perceive that given their creditworthiness the cost of bank financing is too high and thus refused the 
loan offer. So, these firms are not rationed by the bank as in the case of firms partially or totally 
rationed.  Thus, in this last check we repeat our estimation grouping the category of firms that refused 
the loan due to high costs into the category of firms that applied and received almost the full amount 
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and we repeat the estimations of equation 2. In this estimation, an increase of financial fragmentation 
again impacts firm access to finance.  
 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the effect of financial fragmentation on SMEs’ access to finance. So 
far, to our knowledge, the related literature has not devoted much attention to how financial 
fragmentation of sovereign and credit markets impacts on SMEs’ availability of bank credit. This paper 
tries to fill this gap by combining country-level measures of financial fragmentation with the ECB’s 
SAFE survey on access to finance.  
Three main findings emerge from this study. First, we find robust evidence that financial 
fragmentation impairs the availability of bank financing through both quantity and price dimension of 
credit. Moreover, financial fragmentation also influences the latent demand for credit as it increases 
the share of discouraged borrowers. Secondly, we find that an increase in financial fragmentation has 
a larger impact on less creditworthy enterprises. This evidence is consistent with the flight to quality 
hypothesis in lending and the theoretical arguments that claim that information asymmetry problems 
become more severe in some lender-borrower relationships due to greater borrower opacity. Thirdly, 
we show that financial fragmentation reduces firms’ expectations about the availability of future bank 
funds. Interestingly, our results also suggest that different types of firms seem to experience different 
types of credit constraints. For example, newly born and smaller firms exhibit more formal credit 
constraints (loan scaled and loan denial); while informal credit constraints appear more evident for 
newly born firms independently from their size.  
Our findings provide important policy implications for current events and policy responses to 
increased financial sector fragmentation. Based on our results, financial fragmentation leads to higher 
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credit constraints for SMEs. Given the importance of bank credit for the growth of SMEs (Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), credit constraints might lead to real effects such as lower investments and 
employment levels that finally reduced the output of the EU. Therefore, concerns on the ongoing 
fragmentation path in the EU’s financial sector, rebounded after the Brexit referendum, seem to be 
legitimate. Further developments on the process of the banking union and the capital market union 
may improve the integration path across the EU countries with an ultimate result of enhanced risk 
sharing across countries and greater availability of funds for SMEs.  
Naturally, other mechanisms could neutralize or even reverse the benefits of financial 
integration for firms’ access to finance. For example, integration facilitates cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions in the banking sector that will likely to increase the lenders’ relative size. According to 
our results and in line with the empirical works by Ryan et al. (2014) and Carbo et al. (2009), excessive 
concentration in banking markets can significantly impair SMEs’ access to finance. This suggests that 
financial integration could impair firm financing, if not accompanied by policy initiatives aimed at 
maintaining an optimal level of competition in the banking sector. Our results should, therefore, be 
treated with some caution in terms of policy implications and more research should be done to better 
understand the effects of financial fragmentation on SMEs’ access to finance. In our opinion it would 
be interesting to analyse the effect of financial fragmentation on firms’ financing decisions. For 
example, analysing the substitution of bank credit with trade credit and/or other funding sources 
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Table 1. Country level results of financial fragmentation measures 
 
 AT BE DE ES FI FR UK GR IR IT NL PT 
Panel A: Financial fragmentation       
Min. 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Max. 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 
Mean 0.44 0.50 0.58 0.86 0.53 0.51 0.41 1.22 0.55 0.45 0.70 0.81 
St. dev. 0.65 0.65 0.77 1.50 0.64 0.76 0.29 1.21 0.97 0.61 0.61 1.17 
Panel B: Financial fragmentation STL         
Min. 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.14 
Max. 4.00 4.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 
Mean 1.03 0.72 1.25 1.13 1.31 1.12 1.52 1.94 1.22 0.86 1.18 1.63 
St. dev. 1.26 0.97 1.35 1.10 0.99 1.01 1.61 1.45 1.24 1.23 1.24 1.48 
Panel C: Financial  fragmentation MTL 
Min. 0.15 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Max. 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.58 3.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 
Mean 0.84 0.67 1.00 0.80 0.86 0.79 0.33 1.24 0.69 0.70 1.10 1.02 
St. dev. 0.64 0.57 0.96 0.81 0.79 0.90 0.23 0.88 0.75 0.59 1.18 0.83 
Panel D: Financial fragmentation LTL 
Min. 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 
Max. 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 
Mean 0.49 0.96 0.95 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.71 0.81 0.96 0.59 0.70 1.10 
St. dev. 0.50 1.03 0.99 0.86 0.53 0.76 0.97 0.69 1.09 0.64 0.61 1.09 
This table presents country level descriptive statistics of our measures of financial fragmentation constructed using the 
methodology explained in Section 3.1. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of our country-level measure of financial 
fragmentation for the 10-year sovereign bond yields; Panel B, C and D show the descriptive statistics of our country- level 

















Table 2. Key dependent variable statistics 
 
  Number of observations Percentage 
Do not apply because of sufficient internal funds 46,295 43.97% 
Firms that do not apply because of other reasons 22,892 21.74% 
Firms that do not apply because of possible rejection (Discouraged) 6,810 6.47% 
Firms that apply for bank loan 26,748 27.82% 
                   Received almost everything 21,280 79.56% 
                   Loan scaled 2,217 8.29% 
                   Refused the loan due to high costs 561 2.10% 
                  Denied 2,690 10.06% 





























Table 3. Summary Statistics  
 
Variable Observations Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables      
Bank loan – Application 102,745 2.59 1.10 1.00 4.00 
Bank loan – Result 26,748 1.43 0.94 1.00 4.00 
Perceived availability of future funds 83,664 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Firm specific control variables      
Positive outlook  106,427 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Capital improvements 106,427 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Better credit history  106,427 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Family Owner 106,427 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age 106,576 1.33 0.68 1.00 4.00 
Stand Alone 106,576 0.85 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Size 106,576 2.07 0.97 1.00 3.00 
New Firm 106,576 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Financial fragmentation measures      
Financial fragmentation 106,576 0.60 0.93 0.00 5.00 
Financial fragmentation STL 106,576 1.19 1.27 0.00 6.00 
Financial fragmentation MTL 106,576 0.84 0.84 0.00 4.00 
Financial fragmentation LTL 106,576 0.80 0.86 0.00 4.00 
Macroeconomic controls      
CR-5 106,576 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.37 
GDP growth 106,576 0.47 3.43 -9.1 8.5 
Unemployment 106,576 11.21 6.19 4.1 27.5 
This table presents summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables used. Definitions and sources are 












Suff. Internal funds 
Panel A: Multinomial logit estimates 
Financial fragmentation  -0.059***  (0.017) 0.043* (0.027) -0.020 (0.015) 
Outlook Improvement 0.318***  (0.023) 0.159***  (0.013) 0.032 (0.022) 
Capital improvement 0.024***  (0.025) -0.273*** (0.043) 0.379*** (0.023) 
Better credit history 0.194*** (0.024) -0.185*** (0.041) 0.097*** (0.023) 
Stand Alone -0.001 (0.017) -0.033 (0.026) -0.007 (0.016) 
New Firm -0.308 (0.068) 0.038* (0.107) -0.117* (0.063) 
Family Owner 0.247*** (0.018) -0.029 (0.028) 0.050*** (0.017) 
Size 0.028*** (0.009) 0.022 (0.015) 0.020** (0.008) 
CR-5 -0.159*** (0.028) 0.181*** (0.043) -0.032 (0.025) 
GDP growth -0.082*** (0.025) -0.152*** (0.037) 0.240*** (0.022) 
Unemployment 0.198*** (0.030) 0.096** (0.043) 0.025 (0.027) 
Country x Time FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Time FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Country x industry FEs   Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 4.90%   
χ2  12,722.42   
Predictive power 28%   
AIC 246,650.8   
BIC 252,274.8   
Observations 102,745   
Mean VIF 1.10   
Panel B: Marginal effects at the means 
Financial fragmentation -0.029*** (0.003) 0.015*** (0.002) 0.004 (0.004) 
Observations 102,745 102,745 102,745 
Panel A of this table presents the multinomial logit estimates of equation (2) using as a dependent variable Bank loan – 
Application. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm applied for credit, 2 if a firm is discouraged from applying, 3 if 
a firm did not apply because of sufficient funds, 4 if a firm did not apply for other reasons (base category). Financial 
fragmentation is the country level measure of sovereign bond market financial fragmentation. Firm control variables, 
country-level controls and fixed effects are included as specified. Panel B presents marginal effects estimated at the mean 
values. See appendix B, table B.1 for all variable definitions and sources. Continuous independent variables are 
standardised to allow an easier interpretation of the results. All regressions use sampling weights that adjust the sample to 
be representative of the population. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.  
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Panel A: Multinomial logit estimates 
Financial fragmentation  0.298*** (0.049) 0.251*** (0.080) 0.083**  (0.038) 
Outlook Improvement 0.011 (0.058) -0.034 (0.112) -0.048  (0.056) 
Capital improvement -0.228*** (0.063) -0.093 (0.118) -0.335*** (0.062) 
Better credit history -0.325*** (0.061) -0.249** (0.116) -0.559*** (0.062) 
Stand Alone 0.044 (0.045) -0.046 (0.092) 0.028 (0.041) 
New Firm 0.310* (0.217) 0.348 (0.309) 0.404*** (0.149) 
Family Owner -0.044 (0.048) 0.041 (0.091) -0.225*** (0.043) 
Size -0.016 (0.024) -0.146*** (0.047) -0.025* (0.022) 
CR-5 0.245** (0.098) 0.374*** (0.132) 0.320*** (0.072) 
GDP growth -0.245** (0.076) -0.191* (0.118) -0.225*** (0.061) 
Unemployment 0.428*** (0.080) 0.128 (0.134) 0.013 (0.067) 
Country x Time FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Time FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Country x industry FEs   Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 9.28%   
χ2  3,478.84   
Predictive power 79.6%   
AIC 35,107.68   
BIC 39,688.25   
Observations 26,748   
Mean VIF 1.08   
Panel B: Marginal effects at the means 
Financial Fragmentation 0.025***(0.001) 0.021***(0.002) 0.010**(0.002) 
Observations 26,748 26,748 26,748 
Panel A of this table presents the multinomial logit estimates of equation (2) using as a dependent variable Bank loan – 
results. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm applied for credit and received almost everything (base category), 2 
if a firm is loan scaled, 3 if a firm refused a loan due to high costs, 4 if a firm is credit denied in full. Financial fragmentation 
is the country level measure of sovereign bond market financial fragmentation. Firm control variables, country-level 
controls and fixed effects are included as specified. Panel B presents marginal effects estimated at the mean values. See 
appendix B, table B.1 for all variable definitions and sources. Continuous independent variables are standardised to allow 
an easier interpretation of the results. All regressions use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of 
the population. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, 
* at the 10% level.  
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Financial fragmentation  0.326*** (0.054) 0.356*** (0.080) 0.205*** (0.057) 
Financial fragmentation*Outlook improvement 0.047 (0.048) -0.013 (0.087) 0.034 (0.49) 
Financial fragmentation*Capital improvement  -0.093* (0.048) -0.006 (0.088) -0.299*** (0.064) 
Financial fragmentation* Better credit history  -0.172*** (0.050) -0.048 (0.099) -0.289*** (0.063) 
Financial fragmentation*New Firm 0.211 (0.173) 0.313* (0.248) 0.240* (0.168) 
Financial fragmentation*Size 0.012 (0.033) -0.045* (0.037) -0.025 (0.020) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Time FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Time FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Country x industry FEs   Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 8.90%   
χ2  3,320.66   
Predictive power 79.5%   
AIC 35,295.87   
BIC 39,999.35   
Observations 26,748   
Mean VIF 2.11   
This table presents the multinomial logit estimates of equation (3) using as a dependent variable Bank loan – results. The 
dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm applied for credit and received almost everything (base category), 2 if a firm is 
loan scaled, 3 if a firm refused a loan due to high costs, 4 if a firm is credit denied in full. Financial fragmentation is the 
country level measure of sovereign bond market financial fragmentation. Firm control variables, country-level controls 
and fixed effects are included as specified. See appendix B, table B.1 for all variable definitions and sources. Continuous 
independent variables are standardised to allow an easier interpretation of the results. All regressions use sampling weights 
that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *** indicates 












Table 7. Financial fragmentation and firms’ perception of future external funds  
 
 Perceived availability of future funds 
Financial fragmentation -0.050* (0.010) 
Outlook Improvement 0.454*** (0.010) 
Capital improvement 0.135*** (0.011) 
Better credit history 0.411*** (0.011) 
Stand Alone -0.008 (0.008) 
New Firm 0.092** (0.034) 
Family Owner 0.054*** (0.009) 
Size 0.002 (0.005) 
CR-5 0.079*** (0.130) 
GDP growth 0.126*** (0.117) 
Unemployment -0.112*** (0.015) 
Country x Time FEs Yes 
Industry x Time FEs Yes 
Country x Industry FEs   Yes 
Pseudo R2 7.60% 
χ2  9,045.19 
Predictive power 82.3% 
Observations 83,427 
Mean VIF 1.10 
This table presents the probit estimates of equation (2) using firms’ perception of bank financing in the next six months as 
a dependent variable. The estimation period includes all the SAFE questionnaire waves. See appendix B, table B.1 for all 
variable definitions and sources. All regressions include country-time, industry-time and country-industry fixed effects as 
specified. Continuous independent variables are standardised to allow an easier interpretation of the results. All regressions 
use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Robust standard errors are shown in 












Panel A – Multinomial logit excluding crisis period 
Financial fragmentation  0.230** (0.092) 0.337** (0.156) 0.072* (0.091) 
Firm and macro controls Yes   
Country x Time FEs Yes   
Industry x Time FEs Yes   
Country x industry FEs   Yes   
Pseudo R2 6.88%   
χ2  1,438.62   
Predictive power 80.1%   
AIC 19,851.93   
BIC 23,584.75   
Observations 15,269   
Panel B – Multinomial logit on a subsample of firms from core-countries 
Financial fragmentation  0.273** (0.118) 0.404** (0.168) 0.216** (0.097) 
Firm and macro controls Yes   
Country x Time FEs Yes   
Industry x Time FEs Yes   
Country x industry FEs   Yes   
Pseudo R2 9.27%   
χ2  1,566.61   
Predictive power 85.0%   
AIC 12,829.64   
BIC 15,695   
Observations 14,929   
Panel A of this table presents the multinomial logit estimates of equation (2) using as a dependent variable Bank loan – 
results. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm applied for credit and received almost everything (base category), 2 
if a firm is loan scaled, 3 if a firm refused a loan due to high costs, 4 if a firm is credit denied in full. Financial fragmentation 
is the country level measure of sovereign bond market financial fragmentation. Firm control variables, country-level 
controls and fixed effects are included as specified. The estimation period includes the SAFE questionnaire waves: 8 to 16 
(exclude the sovereign debt crisis period). Panel B of this table presents the multinomial logit estimates of equation (2) 
using as a dependent variable Bank loan – results. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm applied for credit and 
received almost everything (base category), 2 if a firm is loan scaled, 3 if a firm refused a loan due to high costs, 4 if a firm 
is credit denied in full. Financial fragmentation is the country level measure of sovereign bond market financial 
fragmentation. Firm control variables, country-level controls and fixed effects are included as specified. The estimation 
period includes all the SAFE questionnaire waves. In this regression we exclude countries affected by the sovereign debt 
crisis: Greece, Ireland, Italy Spain and Portugal. See appendix B, table B.1 for all variable definitions and sources. 
Continuous independent variables are standardised to allow an easier interpretation of the results. All regressions use 
sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Robust standard errors are shown in 














Panel A: Fragmentation STL 
Fragmentation STL 0.130*** (0.041) 0.158** (0.069) 0.070** (0.035) 
Firm and macro controls Yes   
Country x Time FEs Yes   
Industry x Time FEs Yes   
Country x industry FEs   Yes   
Pseudo R2 9.20%   
χ2  3,448.26   
Predictive power 79.6%   
AIC 35,325.6   
BIC 40,029.1   
Observations 26,748   
Panel B: Fragmentation MTL  
Fragmentation MTL 0.203*** (0.059) 0.191* (0.106) 0.061* (0.049) 
Firm and macro controls Yes   
Country x Time FEs Yes   
Industry x Time FEs Yes   
Country x industry FEs   Yes   
Pseudo R2 9.20%   
χ2  3,446.40   
Predictive power 79.5%   
AIC 35,141.35   
BIC 39,713.73   
Observations 26,748   
Panel C: Fragmentation LTL  
Fragmentation LTL 0.357*** (0.079) 0.075* (0.137) 0.091* (0.064) 
Firm and macro controls Yes   
Country x Time FEs Yes   
Industry x Time FEs Yes   
Country x industry FEs   Yes   
Pseudo R2 9.20%   
χ2  3,453.30   
Predictive power 79.6%   
AIC 35,155.71   
BIC 39,728.08   
Observations 26,748   
This table presents the multinomial logit estimates of equation (2) using as a dependent variable Bank loan – results and 
alternative measures of financial fragmentation. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm applied for credit and received 
almost everything (base category), 2 if a firm is loan scaled, 3 if a firm refused a loan due to high costs, 4 if a firm is credit 
denied in full. Firm control variables, country-level controls and fixed effects are included as specified. The estimation 
period includes all the SAFE questionnaire waves. See appendix B, table B.1 for all variable definitions and sources. Firm 
and macro controls are included but not displayed. All regressions include fixed effects as specified. All regressions use 
sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Robust standard errors are shown in 
brackets. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. 
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Panel A – Heckman model   
Financial fragmentation  0.053* (0.034) 0.118* (0.067) 0.096* (0.059) 
Firm and macro controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Time FEs   Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B – Controlling for loan demand   
Financial fragmentation  0.348*** (0.061) 0.028*** (0.104) 0.081* (0.048) 
Firm and macro controls Yes   
Country x Time FEs Yes   
Industry x Time FEs Yes   
Country x industry FEs   Yes   
Pseudo R2 10.97%   
χ2  2,571.62   
Predictive power 79%   
AIC 23,578.32   
BIC 28,115.03   
Observations 16,623   
Panel C – Further control for loan demand  
Financial fragmentation  0.378*** (0.061) 0.322** (0.118) 0.058* (0.051) 
Firm and macro controls Yes   
Country x Time FEs Yes   
Industry x Time FEs Yes   
Country x industry FEs   Yes   
Pseudo R2 11.56%   
χ2  2,360.58   
Predictive power 79.4%   
AIC 19,235.11   
BIC 23,685.48   
Observations 14,495   
Panel A of this table presents the two-step Heckman correction model using as a dependent variable: in column 1 loan 
scaled; in column 2 refused; in column 3 loan application denied and in column 4 discouraged borrowers. In the selection 
equation are included firms that do not apply because of sufficient internal funds of for other reasons. Control variables 
and fixed effects are included as specified. In panel B, equation (2) is run on a subsample of firms that report that their 
most pressing problem is selling their products. In panel C, equation (2) is run on a subsample of firms that declare 
difficulties in selling their products and an increase in product competition. See appendix B, table B.1 for all variable 
definitions and sources. Firm and macro controls are included but not displayed. All regressions include country-time, 
industry-time and country-industry fixed effects as specified. All regressions use sampling weights that adjust the sample 
to be representative of the population. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *** indicates significance at the 1% 










Panel A: Bank loan application demand 
Financial fragmentation  -0.041*** (0.017) 0.058** (0.025) 
Firm and macro controls Yes  
Country x Time FEs Yes  
Industry x Time FEs Yes  
Country x industry FEs   Yes  
Pseudo R2 4.60%  
χ2  7,755.03  
Predictive power 28%  
AIC 246,650.8  
BIC 252,274.8  
Observations 102,745  
Mean VIF 1.10  
Panel B: Bank loan application result 
 Scaled Denied 
Financial fragmentation  0.290*** (0.049) 0.073** (0.039) 
Firm and macro controls Yes  
Country x Time FEs Yes  
Industry x Time FEs Yes  
Country x industry FEs   Yes  
Pseudo R2 9.24%  
χ2  2,978.65  
Predictive power 81.7%  
AIC 30,057.84  
BIC 33,269.98  
Observations 26,748  
Mean VIF 1.08  
Panel A of this table presents the multinomial logit estimates of equation (2) using as a dependent variable Bank loan – 
application modified. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm applied for credit, 2 if a firm is discouraged from 
applying, 3 if a firm did not apply because of sufficient internal funds or for other reasons (base category). Financial 
fragmentation is the country level measure of sovereign bond market financial fragmentation. Firm control variables, 
country-level controls and fixed effects are included as specified. Panel B of this table presents the multinomial logit 
estimates of equation (2) using as a dependent variable Bank loan – results modified. The dependent variable is equal to 1 
if a firm applied for credit and received almost everything and if a firm refused a loan offer due to high costs (base category), 
2 if a firm is loan scaled, 3 if a firm is credit denied. Financial fragmentation is the country level measure of sovereign 
bond market financial fragmentation. Firm control variables, country-level controls and fixed effects are included as 
specified. All regressions use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Robust 
standard errors are shown in brackets. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.  
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Do not apply because 
of possible rejection 
(6,810 obs.)
Do not apply because 
of sufficient internal 
funds (46,295 obs.)




Table A.1. Descriptive statistics of interest rates by country (January 2009 – December 2016) 
 AT BE DE ES FI FR UK GR IR IT NL PT 
10-year sovereign bond yields 
Min. 0.11 0.15 -0.15 1.01 0.06 0.15 0.60 4.52 0.40 1.18 0.03 1.74 
Max. 4.32 4.84 3.47 6.79 3.98 3.90 4.02 29.24 12.45 7.06 3.96 13.85 
Mean 2.18 2.50 1.67 3.74 2.00 2.23 2.31 10.95 4.35 3.71 2.00 5.76 
Median 2.08 2.54 1.55 4.04 1.91 2.28 2.13 9.11 4.36 4.09 1.98 4.62 
St. dev. 1.24 1.36 1.09 1.59 1.15 1.13 0.84 5.71 2.89 1.51 1.15 3.13 
Short-term loan rates 
Min. 1.77 1.92 2.53 1.98 1.74 1.59 2.54 5.39 2.98 2.83 1.28 3.38 
Max. 4.15 4.28 4.94 5.12 3.95 4.40 4.88 7.60 5.13 5.68 4.41 6.65 
Mean 2.42 2.63 3.49 3.49 2.21 2.34 2.88 6.44 3.46 4.17 2.51 5.06 
Median 2.24 2.60 3.37 3.60 2.16 2.08 2.78 6.36 3.39 4.16 2.44 4.99 
St. dev. 0.47 0.43 0.58 0.72 0.35 0.58 0.31 0.66 0.32 0.63 0.66 0.92 
Medium-term loan rates 
Min. 2.09 1.69 2.01 1.91 1.76 1.89 3.20 3.69 2.72 1.90 2.39 3.12 
Max. 4.48 4.28 4.81 5.06 4.52 4.92 5.53 5.90 5.34 4.66 4.26 5.74 
Mean 2.83 2.55 3.15 3.35 2.56 3.02 4.44 4.97 3.27 3.10 2.93 4.32 
Median 2.76 2.46 3.09 3.58 2.46 2.94 4.35 5.04 3.24 3.22 2.89 4.46 
St. dev. 0.48 0.51 0.67 0.68 0.55 0.67 0.48 0.53 0.41 0.55 0.33 0.73 
Long-term loan rates 
Min. 1.97 2.43 2.45 2.10 1.33 2.23 4.98 3.92 2.82 2.52 2.96 2.64 
Max. 4.37 4.88 4.82 5.21 4.38 4.85 5.79 5.76 4.82 5.04 4.60 5.38 
Mean 2.61 3.67 3.49 3.15 2.07 3.24 5.24 4.55 3.13 3.01 3.51 3.40 
Median 2.45 3.73 3.44 3.16 1.83 3.33 5.25 4.62 2.97 2.92 3.41 3.41 
St. dev. 0.48 0.66 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.11 0.45 0.34 0.41 0.34 0.52 
Descriptive statistics of short-term loans, medium-term loans, long-term loans and 10-years sovereign bond yields grouped 
by country.  

























2009H1 73.14% 97.90% 90.44% 97.14% 
2009H2 76.74% 80.67% 89.42% 84.36% 
2010H1 80.00% 46.92% 50.68% 66.59% 
2010H2 84.50% 71.92% 89.48% 84.94% 
2011H1 60.60% 82.40% 86.53% 83.84% 
2011H2 50.60% 75.90% 53.23% 54.74% 
2012H1 74.41% 80.76% 79.78% 87.10% 
2012H2 70.47% 72.16% 82.36% 88.90% 
2013H1 66.43% 41.93% 47.62% 65.12% 
2013H2 58.84% 40.76% 65.59% 58.17% 
2014H1 92.63% 55.70% 50.68% 60.15% 
2014H2 95.97% 69.11% 74.35% 72.17% 
2015H1 83.60% 70.00% 72.49% 89.70% 
2015H2 86.10% 73.37% 76.04% 77.47% 
2016H1 76.73% 70.00% 79.69% 84.66% 
2016H2 95.70% 68.20% 67.65% 84.40% 






















Appendix B. Variables description  
Table B.1. Variable definition  
Variable name Definition Source 
Dependent variables 
Bank loan – 
Application 
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm applied for credit, 2 if a firm is 
discouraged from applying, 3 if a firm did not apply because of sufficient funds, 
4 if a firm did not apply for other reasons. [Question Q7A_a] 
ECB/EC 
SAFE 
Bank loan – Result  The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm applied for credit and received 
almost everything (base category), 2 if a firm is loan scaled, 3 if a firm refused a 
loan due to high costs, 4 if a firm is credit denied. [Question Q7B_a]  
ECB/EC 
SAFE 
Future funds Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm declared a perception of an improvement of 
future funds availability from bank loans and credit lines. [Question Q23] 
ECB/EC 
SAFE 
Financial fragmentation measures 
Fragmentation Country level measure of financial fragmentation of 10 years’ sovereign bond 
yields. Calculated with the Principal component analysis technique described in 
section 3.   
Authors’ 
calculation 
Fragmentation STL Country level measure of financial fragmentation of loans with maturity up to 1 
year. Calculated with the Principal component analysis technique described in 
section 3.   
Authors’ 
calculation 
Fragmentation MTL Country level measure of financial fragmentation of loans with maturity over 1 
year and up to 5 years. Calculated with the Principal component analysis 
technique described in section 3.   
Authors’ 
calculation 
Fragmentation LTL Country level measure of financial fragmentation of loans with maturity over 5 




Firm control variables 
Outlook improvement Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s outlook, with respect to sales, 
profitability and business plan, improved in the past 6 months. [Question Q11_c] 
ECB/EC 
SAFE 
Capital improvement Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s capital position improved in the past 6 
months. [Question Q11_d] 
ECB/EC 
SAFE 
Better credit history  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s credit history improved in the past 6 
months. [Question Q11_e] 
ECB/EC 
SAFE 
Stand alone Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is an autonomous profit-oriented 
enterprise. [Question D2] 
ECB/EC 
SAFE 
New Firm Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has is less than 2 years old.  [Question D5] ECB/EC 
SAFE 





Size Variable equal to: 1 if the firm’s number of employees is less than 9 employees; 
2 if the firm’s number of employees is from 10 to 49; 3 if the firm’s number of 




CR 5 Share of the five largest banks in total assets based on averages of quarterly data 
for each survey wave.  
ECB Data 
warehouse 
GDP Growth The annual growth rate of real GDP based on averages of quarterly data for each 
survey wave.  
Eurostat 
Unemployment The annual unemployment rate based on averages of quarterly data for each 
survey wave. 
Eurostat 
This table shows the variable names, together with their definition and sources. For firm specific variables constructed with 
information from the SAFE questionnaire we report in brackets the number of the question used for an easier replication.  
 
 
 
